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Richard D. Friedman 
'BUSH' Y. 'GORE' 
What was the Supreme Court thinking? 
IJ ne of the most astonishing episodes in American political history ended last month with perhaps the most imperial decision ever by the United States Supreme Court. In one stroke, the Court 
exercised power that belonged to Congress, the legislature of 
Florida, Florida's courts and administrators, and, most im-
portantly, the people of the state. 
The Florida fiasco will probably result in a more equi-
table manner of voting throughout Florida and the nation. 
But if indeed it marks the virtual end of punch-card ballot-
ing, that will be because of initiatives by county officials, 
state legislatures, or Congress, not because the U.S. Supreme 
Court orders it as a matter of federal constitutional law. 
In its December 12 decision, Bush v. Gore, the Court ruled 
that the recount of November's presidential election as or-
dered by the Florida Supreme Court violated constitutional 
requirements. The decision emphasized the variance, not 
only from one county to another but also from one recount 
team to another, of the standard used to determine the "in-
tent of the voter." Most significantly, an incomplete perfo-
ration of a ballot was more likely to be counted as a vote in 
some times and places than in others. 
The recount certainly wouldn't have been perfect. But 
perfection is often unattainable, and lack of perfection, as 
judges who pronounce the importance of judicial restraint 
frequently remind us, does not make a constitutional vio-
"Ah, to nuake a mockery of justice. Just once!" 
lation. The Florida Supreme Court had attempted to resolve 
a very difficult situation and in a very short amount of time. 
Punch ballots, as we all know now, are much less accurate 
than other forms of ballot. It was at least plausible to con-
clude that even a hastily arranged and loosely supervised 
statewide recount would come closer to ascertaining the in-
tent of voters overall than simply ignoring all those ballots 
that the machines had spit out uncounted. Consequently, 
the recount ordered by the Florida court may be seen as an 
attempt to limit this larger disparity. 
Yes, the "intent of the voter" standard established by the 
Florida legislature is open-ended and leaves room for vari-
ation, but so are many other standards-begin with the "rea-
sonable doubt" standard for juries-that courts have 
declined, for good reason, to define more precisely. Reality 
is complex. No simply articulated rule will apply perfect-
ly, and the more intricate the rules, the harder not only to ar-
ticulate but to administer consistently. Perform any recurrent 
task involving any complexity and you will recognize that, 
even if you are the sole actor, your standards will vary. 
And that fact points to a huge irony. For all the U.S. 
Supreme Court majority's insistence on standards, it is hard 
to know what the Court's standard was in this case. It is not 
unusual for a court to caution that in a particular decision it 
is not articulating a broad rule of law but is only deciding the 
case before it, leaving other cases to the future. That is what 
the majority did here. Sometimes such opinions represent 
tentative openings onto new vistas of law. And indeed some 
observers have suggested that the decision in Bush v. Gore 
heralds a new era of constitutional doctrine assuring the 
fairness of voting. But for two reasons a large dollop of cyn-
icism is warranted on this score. 
First there is the identity of the five justices (Rehnquist, 
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas) who anchored the 
majority. (Justices Ginsburg and Breyer agreed rather am-
biguously that the recount raised constitutional difficulties, 
but they disagreed on the ultimate result.) These so-called 
"strict constructionists" are not the ones we would expect to 
perceive the necessity of federal judicial intervention into 
an administrative procedure supervised by the state courts. 
The second reason is that the majority opinion is Pro-
crustean; it articulates rationales just broad enough to cover 
this case. No, says the Court, we're not saying that counties 
can't use different voting systems; what we are saying is 
that when a court orders a statewide remedy, then we're 
really going to worry about uniformity. That's a conclusion, 
not a standard. If the legislature can delegate broad author-
ity to local officials, why can't a court leave it to local officials 
to implement on a case-by-case basis a legislatively pre-
scribed standard for determining the validity of a vote? 
In short, trying to determine fairly who won the election 
in Florida was for the state itself to work out in the first in-
s tance; ultimately it was for Congress to judge in exercis-
ing its constitutional function of counting the electoral votes. 
The U.S. Supreme Court should have stayed out of the mat-
ter altogether. 
Commonweal I 0 January 12, 2001 
Reproduced with pennission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without pennission. 
---------------------------------- -------· -
Though the holding that the recounts violated the Con-
stitution was overly aggressive, it was not particularly egre-
gious. What was egregious was the Court's decision on 
remedy. Given the majority's determination that the re-
counts did not satisfy constitutional requirements, one would 
have expected a remand so that the Florida court could order 
recounts that did meet those requirements. Instead, the five 
justices played what amounts to a sleight-of-hand trick. 
A federal statute of 1887, anticipating another episode 
like the disputed election of 1876, provides a "safe harbor" 
to a state: lf a state sets up a pro-
cedure before the election for re-
solving a dispute over who won, 
and that procedure results in a 
final determination by a certain 
date (December 12 in this in-
stance), then the determination is 
binding on Congress when it 
counts the electoral votes. The 
Florida Supreme Court had indi-
cated that the state's desire to 
take advantage of the safe harbor 
"circumscribed" the determina-
tion of what a "reasonable" dead-
line for recounts was under Flori-
da law. The nation's highest court 
seized on this vaguely stated ex-
pression of desire and used it to 
shut the process down. It was 
clear Florida couldn't have a con-
stitutional recount by December 
12. And, said the five justices, 
Florida didn't want recounts after December 12; therefore, it 
couldn't have recounts at all. That's a leap too far. The Flori-
da court had never indicated that state law demanded fi-
nality by the safe harbor date (which the state statutes do 
not even mention), even if the only constitutional way to 
complete manual recounts (which the state statutes certain-
ly do provide for) would be to miss that date. But the 
Supremes, in contrast to what they had done the first time 
the election f.ght had reached them, did not give the Florida 
court a chance to clarify its meaning. Instead, they effec-
tively declared: Game over. 
Why did they do it? The easy answer, that they simply 
wanted to see a Republican in the White House and were 
willing to do whatever it took to get that result, seems too 
crude, though a rooting interest for that outcome surely af-
fected their thinking. They may have lost faith in the Flori-
da Supreme Court, which had been somewhat overly ag-
gressive in response to the blatant partisanship of Secretary 
of State Katherine Harris. And they may have thought their 
intervention was necessary to yield an orderly resolution. 
If so, the justices misread the situation and the Court's 
own role. Play out what would have happened if the 
Supreme Court allowed a statewide recount to continue, 
subject to whatever safeguard it deemed necessary, and had 
then withdrawn from the scene. First, the easy case: Bush 
may have won the recount. How much more satisfying as a 
result that would have been than the one we have now! 
Now the harder case-Gore wins the recount. Even if the re-
count were incomplete by the date the Electoral College met 
(December 18), the Gore electors could have voted then and 
been certified later (in this case by the courts), as occurred 
with their Hawaii counterparts in 19~1. So there would 
have been two or perhaps three competing slates presented to 
Congress; remember that the legislature was getting into the 
had to answer at the polls. 
act, with its legally unsupport-
able contention that it was enti-
tled. to appoint electors if the elec-
tion were not resolved quickly 
enough. 
And then what? Federal law 
provides that, if multiple slates 
are presented and none qualifies 
for the safe harbor, a slate ac-
cepted by both Houses of Con-
gress prevails. But if the two 
Houses do not agree, then the 
slate certified by the executive of 
the state should be accepted. 
This whole process would 
have been messy. It almost cer-
tainly would have been highly 
partisan. In the end, though, our 
president would have been cho-
sen as always by politics. Mem-
bers of Congress perceived to 
have acted unfairly would have 
In a way, then, the most discouraging aspect of the whole 
affair is not that the Court acted improperly but that we, 
and it, seem to have lost confidence that any other institution 
but the Court is capable of acting properly. Under the Con-
stitution, the electoral votes are opened in Congress, not be-
fore the Supreme Court. And in 1876-77 there was no 
thought that the power to resolve controversies concerning 
the choice of electors resided anywhere else. But now we 
have come to expect the Court to decide great issues of our 
national life. Dred Scott and Roe v. Wade should have per-
suaded the Court that its decisions cannot quell political 
controversy. Bush v. Gore is more stunning than those cases 
in one sense, because it steps on the central function of 
democracy. But it is a one-time intrusion, not an attempt to 
resolve a continuing issue like slavery in the territories or 
abortion. It will not guide future doctrine, and the circum-
stances that allowed the Supreme Court in effect to pick our 
president are unlikely to be repeated. So we just have to 
move on, with the hope that expressions of disgust will 
shape the way history views this debacle. D 
Richard D. Friedman is Ralph W. Aigler Professor of Law at the 
University of Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor. 
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